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FDI and Productivity Spillovers in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Identifying the Transmission Channels 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The object of this paper is to analyse the productivity spillover effects of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by explicitly separating the various transmission channels through 
which they may occur, as well as taking into account firm heterogeneity. We do this for 
a number of sub-Saharan economies utilising a unique firm level data set. Our analysis 
permits a considerably more nuanced approach to evaluating the potential productivity 
spillovers of FDI, as are able to disentangle which spillover transmission effects work, 
and under what particular circumstances. To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is 
the first empirical analysis that examines the different channels through which 
productivity spillovers of FDI can occur in the developing country context, also taking 
into account the differing ability of local firms to benefit from productivity spillovers. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is not only regarded as the sine qua non for growth 
strategies in developing countries, but there is also broad agreement that FDI improves 
the productivity of domestic firms. When foreign firms invest in a host country, they often 
bring with them their proprietary technology (Dunning, 1981; Mebratie and Bedi, 2013). 
Based on the assumption that local firms will be able to benefit from this knowledge 
transfer, many governments carried out policies that encourage FDI by offering extensive 
financial incentives (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Ajakaiye and Page, 2012; Merlevede et 
al., 2014).  
The literature distinguishes between two groups of FDI spillover effects: knowledge 
spillovers and allocative efficiency spillovers. Knowledge spillovers occur via skilled 
labor mobility and also where it demonstrates the feasibility or enables the imitation of 
new technologies. Allocative efficiency spillovers arise from the competitive pressures to 
improve local efficiency using existing technology and resources more efficiently or even 
bringing new technology. This defines the three theoretically posited transmission 
channels of intra-industry productivity spillovers: worker mobility, imitation and 
competition effects. Unfortunately, there is a gap between the theoretical propositions and 
their empirical application.     
The evidence on the actual productivity spillovers of FDI is mixed. We 
systematically reviewed 74 empirical studies providing 1,545 estimated spillovers 
conducted by 96 researchers for 31 developing countries published over 1983-2013. The 
list of studies systematically reviewed are provided in Table A1. Research on FDI 
spillovers lead to inconsistent results that continue to be disputed in the literature. The 
results suggest only about one-third of the cases find significantly positive productivity 
gains, whereas one in six find significantly negative effects. Approximately, 51% report 
either positive or negative, but insignificant, spillover effects. In spite of the policy 
relevance in promoting FDI and the burgeoning of this literature, the empirical evidence 
provides diverging results.  
However, the available 74 empirical studies merely investigate spillover effects in 
terms of whether productivity of local firms is affected by FDI presence. Spillover effects 
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are commonly investigated in a framework of a production function. Productivity of 
domestic firms is regressed on various explanatory variables that introduce one spillover 
variable in terms of foreign share alone in a given industry. Equity, employment, and 
output or sales of the foreign share are three measures of FDI presence.1 Only one of these 
three variables is used to interpret the effect of FDI presence.   
Accordingly, existing studies have not investigated the transmission channels 
through which the productivity spillovers are expected to emerge. This is because the 
three measures of FDI presence mentioned above mainly capture the effects of 
demonstration or contagion spillover type (Kokko, 1996; Hamida, 2013). They cannot 
explain spillovers that are determined by worker mobility (Hamida, 2013) and 
competition effects (Kokko, 1996). In fact, the theoretical model by Wang and Blomström 
(1992) indicate spillovers from competition are not necessarily determined by the share 
of FDI presence alone, but rather mainly by the interaction between domestic and foreign 
firms. Tian (2007) also suggests the share of foreign presence offers only a partial picture 
of spillover effects. Therefore, the implicit assumption of the FDI share alone providing 
the overall spillover effect can be misleading as it disregards certain transmission 
channels. Furthermore, the treatment of the foreign share alone may result in biased 
estimates, as the error term will consist partly of the non-included spillover channels.     
Set against this background, the present article hypothesizes that the share of FDI 
presence alone cannot represent the complete picture of intra-industry productivity 
spillover effects. To do so, we allow the FDI spillover effects to vary according to various 
transmission channels mentioned above, hence bridging the gap between theoretical 
perspectives and their empirical implementation. We also take into account the nature of 
firm-level heterogeneity as local firms will differ in their ability (absorptive capacity and 
technological levels) to benefit from productivity spillovers from foreign firms. The 
empirical literature largely ignores the heterogeneity of both absorptive capacity and the 
technological levels of domestic firms (only 10% of the studies reviewed control for these 
factors).We are interested in using Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), as these countries are 
under-represented in the empirical investigation of the 74 empirical studies reviewed by 
us.  
The rest of the work is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the theoretical 
perspectives on transmission channels and firm-level heterogeneity, setting out 
hypotheses to be examined. Section 3 discusses the data and empirical approach used. 
Section 4 gives the detailed results, and section 5 concludes.  
2. The Framework: Theoretical Perspectives and Hypotheses 
Formulation  
This section first discusses the theoretical perspective of the spillover channels to set out 
a framework for the analysis. Next, it highlights the firm-level heterogeneity related to 
absorptive capacity and technology level. Finally, it highlights the importance of 
geographical proximity and ownership structure. In each sub-section, we set out testable 
hypotheses.         
                                                          
1 Approximately, 18% of the studies reviewed use the foreign share in equity, 35% the foreign 
share in employment and 47% the foreign share in output or sales. 
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2.1. FDI spillovers and transmission channels  
The FDI-induced intra-industry productivity spillover effects are understood to occur via 
three channels: imitation, worker mobility, and competition effects. The theoretical 
channels distinguish the nature of spillover effects into technological and pecuniary 
spillovers. The former operates through the direct effect on production process caused by 
the flow of knowledge from one firm to another firm that is not captured by the market 
mechanism (Papandreou, 1994). While, the latter may result from an indirect effect driven 
by the market mechanism (Scitovsky, 1954).           
First, the imitation/demonstration channel is probably the most typical technological 
spillover assumed to occur through the non-market mechanism (Blomström and Kokko, 
1998). The imitation of new products and processes provided by FDI to the host market 
is assumed to speed up access and utilization of technologies by domestic firms (Ajakaiye 
and Page, 2012). The argument hypothesizes that exposure to superior technology of 
foreign affiliates can lead to productivity or efficiency gains for local firms through 
enhancing their production methods.  
Secondly, the worker mobility channel works through pecuniary or technological 
spillovers. On the one hand, technological spillovers occur when a domestic firm hires 
workers having previously worked for or trained by foreign affiliates, allowing a domestic 
firm to benefit from the experience and knowledge acquired in the foreign firms (Saggi, 
2002). Technological spillovers also emerge when locals previously working for foreign 
subsidiaries setup their own business.  On the other hand, foreign firms may attract skilled 
local workers by paying higher wages than domestic firms. The wage differentials 
between foreign and domestic firms can generate pecuniary spillovers in two ways. First, 
the additional experience and knowledge acquired by local workers while working for 
foreign affiliates might be available to the domestic firms at a price equivalent to this 
wage premium. Second, the presence of a higher wage may put upward pressure on the 
overall industry wage rate, resulting in a negative effect on profits of the domestic firms. 
These may compel domestic firms to be more efficient, thereby generating positive 
pecuniary spillovers, as it occurs through the market mechanism.  
Thirdly, the competition channel is postulated to emerge through the market 
mechanism, yielding pecuniary spillovers. Competition in the local market can be 
interpreted as an incentive for domestic firms to use existing technology and resources 
more efficiently or even adopt new technology, generating positive pecuniary spillovers, 
whereas, negative pecuniary spillovers may result from the existence of a market loss 
effect. Foreign firms may lower the market share of domestic firms by taking part of the 
local market. Furthermore, if domestic firms are unable to compete, foreign firms may 
push them out of the local market; a crowding out effect. 
Over the last four decades, a wide ranging literature has developed the theoretical 
concept of spillover effects. Too often, existing theoretical models do not offer a complete 
picture of the channels outlined above. In the theoretical models of Koizumi and Kopecky 
(1977), Findlay (1978) and Das (1987), spillovers are determined by the foreign share 
alone - the imitation-determined or contagion-spillovers type. Whereas, in Wang and 
Blomström (1992), spillovers are assumed to emerge endogenously resulting from the 
technological competition between foreign and local firms - the competition-determined 
spillovers. Moreover, in the Kaufmann (1997), Fosfuri et al. (2001), and Glass and Saggi 
(2002) studies, spillovers are expected to occur through the movement of workers from 
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foreign affiliates - worker mobility-determined spillovers. Accordingly, we believe that 
the three types of spillovers should be combined in a single estimation to gauge a picture 
of the overall spillover effects. Hence, our main hypothesis is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The occurrence, sign and size of spillover effects vary with respect to the 
channels through which they emerge. 
2.2. Spillover Channels and Firm-level Heterogeneity  
Firms differ in terms of their technological competence and absorptive capacity (Hamida, 
2013). In this case, spillovers may not emerge evenly across firms, or be equally valuable 
to all firms (Merlevede et al., 2014). However, most studies attempted to test spillover 
effects regardless of the nature of firm-level heterogeneity (Demena and Bergeijk, 2016). 
The empirical design of existing studies recognize the importance of factor input and its 
quality, but fail to include some important firm-level heterogeneity. For instance, about 
90% of the specifications do not consider the technological levels and absorptive capacity 
of the domestic firms, a point already stressed by Mebratie and Bergeijk (2013) regarding 
absorptive capacity.  
2.2.1. Spillover Channels and Technological level   
With regard to technological levels, there are two opposing arguments based on economic 
theory. One group hypothesizes that a large technology gap, and a low technology level 
of the host country increases the likelihood of spillover gains. The original model of 
technology spillovers by Findlay (1978), and another by Wang and Blomström (1992), 
put forward the catch-up hypothesis: a positive relationship between the size of 
technological gap and the likelihood of spillovers. The original speculative thinkers of 
this viewpoint are Veblen (1915), followed by Gerschenkron (1962) known as Veblen-
Gerschenkron (VG) effect.2 The other group theorizes that smaller technology gaps may 
lead to potential spillover benefits (Lapan and Bardhan, 1973; Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989). This group maintains the technology accumulation hypothesis, that is, a similar 
technological level between local and foreign technology results in larger spillover 
effects. Hence, a certain technological level seems to be important for spillover benefits.  
According to Mody (1989), firms that are characterized by a relatively high 
technology, but with a small technological gap with the foreign firm, have a greater 
capacity to gain from FDI via imitation and/or competition channels. Firms in the low 
technological group may unable to gain via these channels as such firms lack sufficient 
levels of human capital that enable them to exploit available foreign technologies. Firms 
in low technological group may rather benefit from spillovers through the worker 
mobility channel as this channel can provide technical assistance that allow them to better 
understand and use available foreign technology (Hamida, 2013). Accordingly, our next 
hypothesis is:   
 
Hypothesis 2: Technological gaps are relevant in SSA for the spillover channels and 
benefits largely firms with smaller technological difference vis-à-vis foreign counterparts. 
                                                          
2 Specifically, this theoretical assumption suggests that faster technological transfer takes place 
with relatively greater technological disparity. 
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2.2.2. Spillover Channels and Absorptive Capacity    
With regard to absorptive capacity, spillovers are hypothesized to depend on the existing 
capacity of domestic firms to efficiently exploit external sources of knowledge (Narula 
and Marin, 2003). The concept of absorptive capacity includes the ability of a firm to 
internalize the value of new external information, modify it to fit into their own 
application, and process it productively (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In this case, 
absorptive capacity is not purely about imitation. This is because, firms cannot reap the 
benefit of external knowledge unless they invest in their own absorptive capacity, as the 
knowledge can be specific to the originating firm (Narula and Marin, 2003). 
Consequently, the ability to assimilate and use external sources of information is highly 
related to the level of firm’s prior knowledge. The occurrence and extent of potential 
spillover effects in turn may depend on these collective firms’ abilities, known as 
absorptive capacity. 
Accordingly, high absorptive capacity firms can benefit more from spillovers via 
imitation and/or competition channels, as such firms invest in the quality of their human 
capital. This would allow them to obtain specific foreign techniques through both the 
implementation of foreign technologies and the development of existing ones (Hamida, 
2013). Conversely, firms with low absorptive capacity may only benefit through imitation 
effects, as these firms may not possess the required skilled human capital that would help 
them to cope and compete with foreign rivals. Hence, our third hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The workings and size of the spillover channels is larger for SSA firms 
that invest in building their absorptive capacity.   
2.3. Spillover Channels and Geographic Proximity     
The workings of the spillover channels are also associated with geographical proximity 
(Girma, 2005; Jordaan, 2005). More specifically, Girma (2005) summarizes three main 
reasons for geographical dimension of the channels. First, imitation effects at least 
initially benefit physically proximate domestic firms or ones that operate in the same 
region as foreign firms. The imitation of production of a new product or an efficient 
production of existing product is more likely to take place when both firms are located in 
proximity (Jordaan, 2005). Second, labor mobility is likely to be confined to the same 
locality. Third, the theory of economic geography indicates that the potential for 
spillovers are more pronounced when both types of firms are within geographic 
proximity. Jordaan (2005) adds that the imitation and worker mobility channels are likely 
to generate positive spillovers when the two types of firms are geographically co-located, 
whereas the competition channel is ambiguous as proximity enhances both the occurrence 
of negative and positive pecuniary spillovers.   
Furthermore, in SSA, foreign investment projects tend to concentrate in larger and 
capital cities where financial, infrastructural, human capital and institution systems are 
well developed (Kinda, 2013). This provides a better geographical proximity between 
domestic firms and foreign rivals that in turn may enhance the flow of information. 
Hence, our fourth hypothesis follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Proximity matters for the workings of the spillover channels.  
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2.4. Spillover Channels and Ownership Structure      
With regard to ownership structure, a recent study by Müller and Schnitzer (2006) 
hypothesizes spillover effects to vary with the degree of foreign ownership. Similarly, 
Takii (2005) argues majority ownership enhances transfer of advanced foreign 
technology in the host country, and thus the potential for spillovers but may impede the 
extent of potential leakage. Conversely, a higher local participation as in the case of 
minority foreign subsidiaries provides the opportunity to become acquainted with foreign 
advanced technology, as this allows better access to specific foreign knowledge that 
enhance spillovers (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999). However, the incentive to transfer 
new technology on the part of the foreign subsidiaries may diminish with a higher local 
shared ownership (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). In this regard, foreign subsidiaries may 
prefer a higher majority ownership to protect the extent of firm-specific knowledge and 
technology leakages. However, Takii (2005) further argues that foreign subsidiaries may 
not sufficiently control the extent of knowledge and technology leakages. If so, the 
occurrence and extent of spillovers is likely to come about from majority than minority 
foreign subsidiaries. The fear of technology leakages on the part of the latter type may 
not transfer advanced technology from the parent company. Hence, our last hypothesis:                 
 
Hypothesis 5: The occurrence and size of spillover effects is mainly driven by the 
majority-foreign-owned firms in SSA.  
The theoretical perspectives discussed above have various implications for empirical 
investigation. For instance, too often the empirical examination of the relative importance 
of the labor mobility channel (in terms of either technological or pecuniary spillovers) is 
difficult to investigate as it requires tracking workers employed or trained by foreign firms 
and also those who setup their own business. Furthermore, the literature is largely 
confined to formulating a linear form relationship between productivity gains and FDI. 
This is mainly due to the theoretical expectation that spillovers are largely dependent on 
the extent of foreign ownership alone (see Koizumi and Kopecky, 1977). However, the 
relationship can also be non-linear in that spillovers might increase, and then decline 
beyond a certain point.  
3. Data and Empirical Approach   
3.1. Data Construction and Descriptive Analysis 
We construct firm-level panel data obtained from separate panel datasets of the World 
Bank’s Regional Programme on Enterprise Development. The World Bank enterprise 
surveys are designed to provide longitudinal datasets through a stratified sampling 
approach (World Bank, 2014). The top priority of the surveys is to provide rich datasets 
to investigate changes in business environment that affect productivity at the firm level 
both over time and across countries. The Surveys cover the non-agricultural formal 
private sector and employ the same sampling methodology and survey instruments across 
all countries using three levels of stratification, namely, region, sector and firm size.3 
                                                          
3 For a thorough presentation of sampling: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/methodology   
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Business sectors are defined in accordance with the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) Rev. 3.1 2-digit classification.4  
As illustrated in Table 1, based on data availability, we construct data from eight 
SSA countries (Congo Democratic Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia) spanning the period 2006–2014. The standardized sampling strategy 
and questionnaire enabled us to construct a dataset of the aforementioned SSA countries. 
Although the dataset comprises 8,801 foreign and domestic firms, our investigation is 
restricted to 1,590 firms, as the empirical strategy requires a panel data analysis. Of the 
panel sample, about 85% are domestic firms. In terms of the number of establishments 
interviewed in each SSA country of the panel sample, Senegal represents the highest 
sample size: 30% of the total panel sample. In contrast, Tanzania and Ghana are the 
countries with lowest sample size of the interviewed firms: respectively, three and four 
percent of the total panel sample. The other SSA countries represent approximately a 
similar sample distribution of 10-19%.  
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
 
Table 2 presents the ownership distribution of the firms. These surveys comprise 
firm-level information for 8,801 in both surveys of the data (3,632 in the first wave/2006 
and 5,169 in the second wave/2014).  In 2006, 3,632 firms were interviewed, but only 
795 again in 2014. Thus, 2,837 firms were surveyed only in 2006 and 4,374 firms were 
surveyed only in 2014. Of the 4,374 firms surveyed only in 2014, 72.9% (3,188) of the 
firms commenced operations before 2006. So that a large number of firms started 
operation before 2006 but were not included in the 2006 survey. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Another concern is whether the 2,837 firms interviewed only in 2006 and not 
included in 2014 were excluded due to exit from their industry or because of other 
systematic or non-systematic random factors. If firms that drop out differ systematically 
from firms that continue, then the information from the continuing firms is no longer 
representative of the whole sample. In that case, we examine whether the attrition is 
systematically associated with firm characteristics or is entirely random. We provide an 
attrition probit model where the dependent variable takes the value 1 for firms which 
dropout after the first wave and 0 otherwise. Results of the attrition probit are provided 
in Table A2. The probit regression indicates that attritted firms are not systematically 
different from retained firms at any conventional level, as none of the firm characteristics 
is statistically significant.   
Tables 3 and 4 list summary statistics, and Table A3 gives the definition of the 
variables. The commonly stylized facts found in the literature of FDI spillovers are also 
confirmed in our sample of panel data. Foreign-owned firms tend to be more productive, 
                                                          
4 For a detailed discussion of the ISIC: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=17  
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with greater employment and formal training provision, operate for a longer period, are 
more adept at exporting, and have a higher technological level. Another key difference is 
the size of technological gap. While the bulk of the domestic firms (77%) fall in the 
category of large technological gap, only 43% of the foreign firms fall into this category. 
Foreign firms on average have 138 workers as compared to 42 workers for domestic 
firms. All these differences are statistically significant at 1%. Moreover, foreign firms are 
likely to have operated for a longer period (on average 20 years). In terms of firm size, 
foreign firms appear to fall approximately equally in all the three categories. In sharp 
contrast, the bulk of domestic firms (67%) fall into the category of small-sized firm. 
However, exceptionally both domestic and foreign firms are likely to be similarly 
endowed in terms of capital intensity.    
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Table 4 offers an idea about summary statistics for the spillover channels. The 
statistics are based on a clustered analysis of 8 countries and 26 industries5. The statistics 
show that the majority-foreign-owned firms mainly explain the spillover variables. This 
is also consistent with the competition channel that shows a lower mean value for 
majority-owned firms. This is because competition in the local market is calculated as the 
difference between sales and costs over total sales so that a value close to 0 indicates 
heightened competition, with firms’ prices close to costs (Narula and Marin, 2003). This 
indicates the existence of high competition within majority as opposed to minority-
foreign-owned firms. 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
In order to standardize the data, we converted all data from local currency units into 
U.S. dollars and deflated them using gross domestic product (GDP) deflator (i.e., in U.S 
dollars with 2000 as the base year).6   
     
3.2. Empirical Approach 
We design a model of spillover effects within the context of a production framework in 
which output is a function of capital, labor and access to technology. With regard to the 
outcome variable, the empirical literature uses a production function of either a one-step 
                                                          
5 For the list of the industries (A.4 Industry Questionnaire – it contains 27 industries. However, the datasets 
for SSA do not contain information about recycling, ISIC 37): 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/GIAWB/EnterpriseSurveys/Documents/Methodology/ES_Man
ufacturing_Questionnaire.pdf   
6 We have obtained all data related to exchange rates and GDP deflators from the World Development 
Indicators - http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.         
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direct approach (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Hamida, 2013, Mebratie and Bedi, 2013), 
or a two-step indirect estimation technique (see Waldkirch and Ofosu, 2010; Merlevede 
et al., 2014). The former employs a direct approach of the FDI effect using labor 
productivity, output or value-added as the dependent variable. Whereas the latter uses an 
indirect approach of total factor productivity. We note that there is no consensus on the 
appropriateness of the one-step versus the two-step approach. However, a recent meta-
analysis suggests a one-step approach given that this literature has been influenced by a 
selection bias towards positive estimates (Demena and Bergeijk, 2016). Hence, we opted 
for a direct approach of labor productivity.7  
Our baseline equation is:  
 
)1..(..........)ln( 76543210 ijtijtijtijtjtijtxjtijt XTGACFDIsFDICITLP   
 
 
The subscripts i, j, and t, represent firm, industry and time respectively. The inclusion 
of time dummy (Tt) accounts for any possible regional trends and economic events. 
Likewise, the inclusion of industries fixed effects (Ix) accounts for unobservable time-
invariant effects that may drive changes in labor productivity, for instance, attractiveness 
of a particular industry. A full set of countries fixed effects is included to account for 
unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity in countries, for instance, attractiveness of a 
particular country (e.g., better infrastructural presence). Accordingly, the inclusion of 
time dummy, country and industry fixed effects addresses the econometric concerns of 
omission of unobserved variables that may breakdown the exogeneity condition relevant 
to obtaining unbiased and consistent estimates.  
Unlike existing studies where FDIsjt is measured through foreign share alone, this 
study disaggregates spillover measures into the abovementioned three channels. First, the 
imitation effects measured as the share of total sales accounted by foreign firms (see 
Hamida, 2013). The imitation effect works via the direct contact between local and 
foreign firms. This effect captures the knowledge of processes and products available in 
the domestic market by foreign firms. After observing a new product or process 
innovation and also allowing for their feasibility, domestic firms may strive to copy and 
use it (Meyer, 2004; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007).  
Second, the worker mobility channel measured with the interaction term between 
foreign presence and human capital in terms of domestic employees (see Meyer and 
Sinani, 2002, 2004; Hamida, 2013). This variable is assumed to measure the combined 
effect of the presence of foreign share in the industry and the level of human capital at 
the domestic firm level on the productivity of the domestic firm. This interaction 
investigates the worker mobility-determined spillover in the domestic market that is 
supposed to be co-determined by the interaction of these two variables.  
Third, following Chung (2001) and Narula and Marin (2003), the competition effects 
measured by firm’s price markup. We use the differences between a firm’s total sales and 
costs over total sales to measure price markup. The firm level price markup is an 
                                                          
7 McKenzie (2011) indicates labor productivity is important for generating long-run growth and creating 
job opportunities for the young and growing African labor force. Buckley et al. (2007a) and Mahmood 
(2008) also point out that the use of labor productivity is an appropriate outcome variable, as it has potential 
importance in improving the living standard and wages in the domestic economy.   
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appropriate measure of the level of competition (Hamida, 2013). When the price markup 
is close to 1 or there is a high markup, competition is low. Conversely, when it is close to 
0, competition is higher. A decrease in the markup is therefore heightened competition. 
This follows a negative coefficient associated with a decrease in the markup (increased 
competition), followed by an improvement in domestic productivity (Chung, 2001). 
To test for a curvilinear spillover effect, we include squared terms of the three 
spillover variables in Eqn. 1. We also include a set of control variables (Xijt) WHAT ARE 
THEY???, measure of foreign ownership (FDIijt), absorptive capacity (ACijt), and the 
technological gap (TGijt) outlined in Table A3 and the time-variant error term (εijt). With 
regard to technological gap, we use the ratio of average productivity of foreign-owned 
firms to domestic firms own productivity in a given industry and country (see Haddad 
and Harrison, 1993; Haskel et al., 2007). To split our sample into small and large 
technological gap, we use a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if domestic firm 
productivity is below the average productivity of foreign firm and 0 otherwise (see 
Jordaan, 2005; Hamida, 2013). When a dummy is 1, the gap is high, whereas when a 
dummy is 0, the gap is small. For absorptive capacity, we use a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 when a domestic firm provides formal training programs for its employees 
and 0 otherwise. Although recently Chung and Lee (2015) report absorptive capacity 
measured through its origin, i.e., licensing of foreign technologies but they do 
acknowledge the importance of on-the-job training programs as an alternative way to 
build absorptive capacity.8  
In terms of empirical estimation, given the two-period panel data, we performed a 
set of econometric tests to provide better estimations. First, we adopt the Breusch-Pagan 
Langrange multiplier (BP-LM) test.  The BP-LM tests allows us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the pooled OLS method is efficient in favor of the random-effects model. 
Next, we apply the Hausman test that suggests that the random-effects model is not 
appropriate, indicating the appropriateness of fixed-effects estimation.  
Following the empirical strategy outlined above, several concerns are addressed in 
terms of econometric issues. First, the omission of unobserved variables. We address this 
issue by including time-invariant fixed effects as well as a time dummy and a set of time-
variant firm-level variables. Second, concerns related to endogeneity or potential 
selection bias. For instance, if a foreign firm gravitates into the most productive industry, 
then the observed result of productivity spillovers will overstate the impact from FDI. 
The best way to address this possibility is to estimate fixed-effects (Konings, 2001; 
Hanousek et al., 2011; Mebratie and Bedi, 2013). In addition to the usual methods of 
econometrics of panel data, estimation of fixed-effects is, therefore, likely to mitigate the 
possibility of reverse causality from domestic productivity to foreign investment. Third, 
we conduct further analysis and a set of several robustness checks for the sensitivity of 
our results as well for any possible measurement errors, through alternative 
specifications. All of these empirical approaches address econometric concerns that may 
have biased the estimates of previous research. Importantly, we adopt a set of lessons 
from a recent meta-analysis (Demena and Bergeijk, 2016). 
                                                          
8 Our data do not contain variables that would adequately capture licensing of foreign technologies.  
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4. Estimation Results and Discussion 
4.1. Spillover Transmission Channels  
A set of different estimations are presented in this section. We start with whether the three 
spillover channels should be included separately or simultaneously in Eqn. 1. The Wald 
test justifies the simultaneous estimation of the channels at 1% statistical significance 
level. To better visualize the results and keep the table manageable, we report only results 
relating to the transmission channels.  
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
Table 5 gives the results from the fixed-effects model testing our first hypothesis.9 
We report the estimated effect of both linear and curvilinear models of Eqn. 1. We 
conduct the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) to determine between linear and 
curvilinear specifications. The AIC supports the curvilinear specification as lower AIC 
implies little information loss in the model.10 Indeed, the existence of a significant 
competition effect in the curvilinear specification alone is adequate to reject the linear 
model.      
Estimation of our preferred curvilinear specification (Panel A2) gives significant 
imitation and competition effects. The imitation channel indicates FDI creates positive 
spillover influences on domestic productivity. More specifically, a 10% point increase in 
foreign presence is associated with an 18% increase in labor productivity of domestic 
firms, indicating the presence of technological spillovers.  The findings supports the 
theoretical position that foreign affiliates speed up the access and transfer of new product 
and process in the host economies (Wang and Blomström, 1992; Meyer, 2004). 
The competition channel that points to the non-linear specification show that an 
increase in competition generated by FDI presence enhances the productivity of domestic 
firms. This indicates the presence of positive and significant pecuniary spillovers. The 
relatively low estimated effect size of the C2 (which is not different from zero), as 
compared to C, shows decreasing spillover effects when the level of competition goes 
beyond a certain point due to an increase in FDI presence. This means that spillovers 
demonstrate the presence of a non-monotonic relationship with FDI presence, where the 
positive effects are dominant when there is low or moderate foreign presence, and 
exceeding some level of increased foreign presence, spillover effects begin to decrease. 
This might indicate the existence of market-steal/loss effects when the level of 
competition due to an increase in FDI penetration is past a certain point.  
Results of Panel A, therefore, corroborate our first hypothesis that the occurrence, 
sign and size of spillover effects vary with respect to the channels through which they 
                                                          
9 Due to some missing data for the technological gap, markup, labor productivity and absorptive capacity 
variables, the regression uses a sample of only 1,576. 
10 We also conduct F-tests that suggest the curvilinear specification is better compared to the linear one at 
1% significance level.     
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emerge. This important finding may help to explain why the resulting estimates using the 
share of foreign presence alone cannot describe the whole picture of spillover effects. In 
this regard, it is appropriate to investigate the three spillover channels simultaneously in 
order to capture the overall influence of FDI. Next, our study goes further to separate 
domestic firms according to technological levels and absorptive capacity.          
4.2. Spillover and Technological Level of Domestic Firms 
We estimate two separate regressions for our measure of technological gap. Table 6 gives 
the results testing the second hypothesis. Panel B1-B2 and Panel C3-C4 present the results 
for small and large technological gaps, respectively. Again, we conduct the AIC for linear 
versus curvilinear specifications and the results suggest better fit of the curvilinear 
specifications (B2 and C4) in both the small and large technological gap groups.   
 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
Our main findings seem to confirm that spillovers are a positive function of the level 
of technology. Higher technological domestic firms seem to experience significant 
positive spillover effects from the imitation channels (Panel B versus Panel C). That is, 
firms with small technological gap are better to identify and exploit the introduction of 
new technological opportunities into a local market associated with the presence of FDI. 
This can be an indication that these firms are not far from the average technological 
frontier of a given industry and have sufficient scope for potential imitation-determined 
spillovers. In contrast, relatively large technological gap domestic firms seem to be hit 
significantly by the presence of foreign counterparts, or fail to reap spillover benefits from 
imitation. This may suggests the presence of a reverse spilling-over effect.  
With regard to labor mobility, it is positive and significant for the large technological 
gap group, indicating that the combined effect of foreign presence and local human capital 
results in an increase in domestic productivity. This confirms the results of Hamida (2013) 
in that such firms can benefit greatly via the worker mobility channel, as this can 
contribute to technical assistance that can allow such firms to better understand and use 
foreign technologies.  
C becomes significant for both technological groups, but negative for small gap firms 
and positive for large gap firms, indicating the presence of pecuniary spillovers. Small 
technological gap firms appear to benefit spillovers through the competition channel as a 
decreased markup (heightened competition) is followed by an increase in productivity. In 
contrast, large technological gap firms seem unable to cope with the competition from 
foreign presence, suggesting the occurrence of market-steal/loss effects. C2 is positive 
and significant for small technological gap firms, demonstrating that the benefits from 
competition effects emerge when the level of foreign presence is lower or moderate. Once 
foreign presence goes past some level, pecuniary spillovers start to fall as intense 
competition creates market-losing effects, implying a curvilinear relationship. This 
confirms theoretical expectations that a high-level of foreign presence intensifies 
competition that even hurts the relatively high technological firms. The findings also 
confirm what we discover for the full sample in Table 5 where the high technology firms 
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appear to dominate spillover benefits. This corroborates our second hypothesis that the 
workings of the channels and the size of the effects vary according to domestic 
technological levels. The benefit is much larger for SSA firms with smaller technological 
differences vis-à-vis their foreign counterparts. Large technological gap firms appear to 
benefit from spillovers only through the labor mobility channel. This group of firms is 
better to invest in hiring local workers who have worked for or were trained by foreign 
affiliates by offering a higher wage as long as the marginal benefit of recruiting is larger 
than its marginal cost in order to offset the market-losing effects from the competition 
channel.           
Our evidence is contrary to the original theoretical formulation of VG effects (and 
Findlay, 1978) that indicate technological effects will takes place faster when there is a 
greater relative technological gap between domestic and foreign firms. This was the basic 
theoretical assumption behind a number of developing country policies attempting to 
attract FDI in high technology sectors (Fan, 2002). By contrast, our evidence indicates 
that this was not a valid assumption. Rather, SSA’s domestic firm productivity appears 
to benefit from foreign entry when the technological gap is smaller, supporting the 
theoretical assumption of Lapan and Bardhan (1973), among others.  
4.3. Spillover and Absorptive Capacity of Domestic Firms 
Table 7 gives results of the spillover channels that vary in terms of absorptive capacity 
testing the third hypothesis. Again, we conduct the AIC and find the linear specification 
is superior to the curvilinear one for the high absorptive group. However, for the low 
absorptive group the curvilinear specification is preferable to the linear specification.11   
 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
With regard to the imitation channel, it appears that domestic firms in both groups 
(low and high absorptive capacity) internalize spillover gains. This suggests that firms in 
the low absorptive capacity group are also apt to understand and imitate foreign 
knowledge. This can be inconsistent with some existing findings. For instance, Kathuria 
(2001) reports significant positive effects for Indian manufacturing firms with only 
relatively high absorptive capacity. Note that this result is not with respect to the channels, 
rather only using the share of foreign presence alone.    
Furthermore, C is significant for both groups of firms but the estimated effect size is 
not different from zero for low absorptive capacity firms, suggesting industries in the 
latter group do not seem to internalize spillover benefits through competition effects (D2 
versus E3). Hamida (2013) highlights the competitive pressure generated by foreign 
                                                          
11 Indeed, the inclusion of squared terms (full model) for low absorptive group result in significant C and 
C2 with indistinguishable from zero effects and thus do not contribute any additional information. In 
contrast, for high absorptive capacity firms LM2 and C2 are significant, indicating an increase in spillover 
effects when the level of labor movement (i.e., the combined effect of foreign presence and local human 
capital) and competition beyond a certain point due to an increase in FDI presence. However, in the latter 
case the AIC suggests a significantly better fit of the linear than the curvilinear specification.      
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presence encouraging domestic firms with high absorptive capacity to work harder to 
exploit existing resources and technology more efficiently to improve productivity via 
competition effects. In line with this, a negative and significant C implies that a decreased 
markup (heightened competition) is followed by an increase in domestic productivity, 
i.e., positive pecuniary spillover effects.  
Again, the findings are consistent with estimated effects of the full sample, in that 
the high absorptive group corroborates the corresponding spillover effects observed in 
the full sample. Firms with high absorptive capacity attempt to gain spillover benefits 
through both the imitation and competition channels. The ability of these kinds of firms 
to absorb foreign technologies is largely determined by the quality of their human capital 
as these firms invest in training their employees that allow them to acquire specific 
foreign technologies. The findings confirms that high absorptive capacity firms are able 
to cope and fiercely compete with foreign counterparts that induce them to use their 
existing technology and resources more efficiently and imitate advanced foreign 
technologies. Results are in line with the absorptive capacity hypothesis and empirical 
results of Kathuria (2001), Narula and Marin (2003) and Hamida (2013). 
4.4. Further Investigations and Robustness Checks 
In this section, we look into further analyses to test the remaining (fourth and fifth) 
hypotheses and several robustness checks related to our findings outlined above. The 
former deals with the question of ownership structure and geographical proximity. The 
latter explores the sensitivity of our findings to the: (1) construction of the spillover 
variables; (2) construction of the outcome variable; (3) introduction of a set of industry-
time interaction dummies; and (4) estimation method.  
 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
 
a) Further investigation: spillover effects and ownership structure   
In Table 8, we allow the construction of spillover channels to vary in terms of minority- 
and majority-foreign-owned firms. We do this by dividing the previous version of 
foreign-ownership into two variables. In Panel F, we define majority foreign ownership 
with 50% or more ownership, and set to zero if foreign ownership is less than 50%. 
Similarly, Panel G presents the minority foreign ownership with less than 50% (but at 
least 10%). The AIC supports the linear specification over the curvilinear one.12         
Our finding corroborate the view that the advanced technology of majority-foreign-
owned firms mainly drives the spillover benefits. A possible explanation is that foreign 
investors may be more inclined to bring with them their proprietary technology when they 
own majority ownership control over subsidiary operations. Furthermore, majority-
owned firms somewhat enhance the workings of the worker mobility channel, but impair 
                                                          
12 In fact, the inclusion of squared terms (full model) for majority-owned-foreign firms does not contribute 
any additional information, whereas for the minority-owned-foreign firms only C2 contributes additional 
information with a similar overall message. 
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benefit from the competition channel. The latter may suggests that although advanced 
technologies of majority subsidiaries offer the possibility for larger spillovers, they may 
impede spillovers through market-losing effects. In other words, market-losing effects of 
foreign presence can hamper the scope for competition-determined spillovers. An 
alternative explanation could be that domestic firms encounter the presence of highly 
negative competition effect from majority-owned firms than the minority-owned firms.      
Panel G3, on the other hand, shows that minority-foreign-owned firms appear to 
induce spillover benefits only through the workings of the competition channel. This 
benefit is similar to the estimated effect of the full sample (Table 5). This suggests the 
minority-foreign-owned firms mainly drive the competition spillover benefits of the full 
sample. It is also an indication that the minority foreign investors are unwilling or unable 
to take along their most advanced technologies to host countries, thus causing the scope 
of imitation and worker mobility spillovers to be limited. This thesis is consistent with 
Merlevede et al. (2014) and supports the hypothesis that the occurrence and size of 
spillover effects is predominantly driven by the majority-foreign-owned firms. 
b) Further investigation: spillover effects and geographic proximity      
To examine geographical proximity, we provide estimates for only firms located over the 
eight largest and capital cities alone (Panel H in Table 9).13 Again, we conduct the AIC 
that support the curvilinear specifications (H2 and I4) better fit the data than the linear 
one (H1 and I3). In terms of both sign and significance of the channels, H2 corroborates 
the corresponding estimates in A2 of Table 5 estimated across the eight SSA. The current 
magnitude of estimated spillover effects are much larger and the differences are 
statistically significant. This is in line with the notion that geographical proximity or 
concentration of industries enhances the magnitude of spillover effects through the 
workings of the imitation and competition channels. 
 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
   
In line with the concentration of firms on the largest and capital cities, Grether (1999) 
and Jordaan (2008) provide a measure of geographical distribution of an industry. In this 
sense, they find positive association of labor productivity of Mexican firms and the level 
of geographical distribution of an industry. This indicates the importance of controlling 
for distribution of firms over geographical location. The level of geographical distribution 
of industries over the regions of the establishment of the SSA included in the dataset is 
captured through the variable Gini. Even though, the Gini coefficient is usually used to 
measure the level of income inequality, we follow Grether (1999) and Jordaan (2008) to 
obtain an indication of the level of distribution of industries over geographical regions. 
We capture the variable Gini using the share of a regional industry in regional total 
employment over the share of a national industry in national total employment. In this 
sense, a high Gini coefficient suggests a high level of geographical agglomeration of 
industries. 
                                                          
13 These are Kinshasa (DRC), Accra (Ghana), Lilongwe (Malawi), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Kampala 
(Uganda), Lusaka (Zambia), Dakar (Senegal) and Nairobi (Kenya).   
16 
 
Panel I4 gives the estimates that includes the variable Gini to capture the level of 
geographical distribution of industries. First, consistent with Grether (1999) and Jordaan 
(2008), the Gini coefficient is significant. This indicates the level of geographical 
agglomeration of industries have a significant association with the measured labor 
productivity. This is in line with the notion that geographical concentration of economic 
activities (industries) can facilitate the existence of agglomeration economies. 
Specifically, this can lead to creation of better information spillovers. Second, the current 
estimated spillover effects corroborate the corresponding findings of Panel A2 in Table 
5. This is can be an indication that the initial omission of the Gini variable is not causing 
an omitted variable bias, as the estimated spillover effects remain unaltered.  
In line with theoretical predications of Girma (2005) and Jordaan (2005), the current 
findings indicate a larger positive spillover effects when firms geographically located in 
close proximity (Panel H2 versus Panel A2). The main difference is that the effectiveness 
vary in terms of the channels as observed in Panel H2. The labor mobility channel is more 
likely to generate insignificant effects. Whereas, the workings of the competition channel 
indicates very small magnitude but positive and statistically significant effects. However, 
the workings of the imitation channel is in line with the theoretical expectations of Girma 
(2005) and Jordaan (2005). The results support the hypothesis that geographical 
proximity or concentration is likely to enhance the workings of these channels, but mainly 
for imitation and competition effects.  
c) Robustness Checks  
The robustness checks using various sensitivity analyses uniformly confirm our main 
findings.  Frist, in Table 10, Panel J, introduces the dummy instead of the share version 
of the spillover variables and Panel K, replaces the separate industry and time dummies 
with a set of industry-time interaction dummies. The curvilinear specification is preferred 
over the linear one for a similar reason indicated earlier. The spillover results of J2 and 
K4 corroborate the corresponding findings of Panel A2 in Table 5. However, unlike the 
estimate of Panel A2, I in J2 appears to generate insignificant effect.   
 
<Insert Table 10 about here> 
 
Next, in Table 11, Panel L14 and Panel M, replaces the definition of our outcome 
variable and uses estimation of the random-effects method, respectively. Again, in both 
Panel L and M the curvilinear specifications are preferred. L2 uses the value added per 
worker rather than the sales per worker definition of labor productivity. Our main findings 
of spillover results are again confirmed. Generally, the results are an indication that the 
use of either of the definition of labor productivity does not much matter for spillover 
analysis. In another robustness check, Panel M4 replaces fixed-effects with random-
effects in our spillover estimation method. Again, our main findings of Panel A are 
confirmed once more.  
                                                          
14 Because of missing information, 52 domestic firms are dropped when we replace the sales per 
worker definition of the labour productivity with the value added per worker.  
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<Insert Table 11 about here> 
 
5. Conclusion 
One of the main reasons why developing country policy makers pay special attention to 
attracting FDI inflows is the expected valuable productivity spillover gains (Ajakaiye and 
Page, 2012; Buckley et al., 2007b; Hamida, 2013). The substantial increase in FDI 
penetration in developing countries has, in turn, spawned a substantial empirical literature 
seeking to measure the spillover effects. This literature has mainly attempted to measure 
FDI-spillover effects using the foreign share alone. According to Hamida (2013), this 
approach captures only the effects of imitation or contagion spillovers. Tian (2007) 
indicates that the share of foreign presence offers only a partial picture of spillover effects, 
and thus cannot capture the overall effects. Kokko (1996) and Wang and Blomström 
(1992) argued that the competition-determined spillover effects cannot be represented by 
the presence of foreign share alone. Hence, the approach of foreign share cannot fully 
describe how spillover effects actually emerge, mainly as it disregards other channels. 
Correspondingly, the literature largely presumes that spillovers occur evenly across firms, 
for example nine in ten of the existing effects are considered to emerge irrespective of the 
role of absorptive capacity and technological level of domestic firms.   
To overcome the existing gap, this paper allows spillover effects to vary according 
to various different transmission channels, and also seeks to separate domestic firms in 
terms of their technological level and absorptive capacity. Furthermore, we also test for 
linear or non-linear effects. Using an unexplored recent panel data from SSA, our results 
although in line with theory, yield different results to the extant empirical literature on 
spillovers of DI in developing countries. First, productivity gains to domestic firms 
depends on the specific transmission channel. In the full sample, FDI presence generates 
significant spillover benefits through both imitation and competition channels, but fails 
to do so through the labor mobility channel. The findings of the competition channel 
supports the curvilinear relationship signaling the occurrence of market-losing effects 
counteracting the initial spillover benefits when local competition due to foreign 
penetration is low or moderate. The magnitude of the spillover effects are larger for the 
imitation effect relative to the competition channel, and the difference is statistically 
significant as well as remaining stable across several specifications.   
Secondly, a similar spillover pattern appeared for firms in the smaller technological 
difference group, showing that industries with high technological levels predominately 
contribute to the total spillover effects found for the full sample. It also implies that 
market-losing effects are stronger in small technological gap industries after the initial 
level of competition goes beyond certain points where higher foreign penetration 
intensifies the level of direct competition. Industries in the large technological gap class 
appeared to gain spillovers only through the labor mobility channel. This may be an 
indication that these industries can only understand and use foreign technology through 
this channel as this facilitates skills acquisition to implement foreign technology. The 
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findings do not support the VG theoretical assumption. Rather, it supports the technology 
accumulation hypothesis.  
Thirdly, both low and high absorptive firms benefit through the imitation-determined 
spillovers. However, only local firms with relatively high level of absorptive capacity 
absorb the competition-determined spillovers. This is in line with the theory that 
absorption is not purely about imitation (Narula and Marin, 2003; Hamida, 2013). Instead, 
only firms that have invested significantly in their absorptive capacity are able to 
internalize the FDI spillover gains more efficiently.      
Fourthly, the advanced technology of majority-foreign-owned firms, which accounts 
for a higher industry share in the SSA case, mainly drives the spillover benefits from the 
imitation and worker mobility channels. When there is a smaller foreign industry share, 
minority-foreign-owned firms appear to generate spillover effects only through the 
workings of the competition channel. Accordingly, our result suggest that majority-
owned firms mainly drive the knowledge spillover, whereas minority-owned firms 
stimulate the allocative efficiency spillover. The latter can be an indication that minority-
owned firms are unwilling or unable to bring their advanced technologies to the domestic 
economy as a lower degree of managerial control may reduce the incentive to transfer 
technology to their subsidiaries. Last, the effect of geographical proximity or 
concentration enhances the magnitude of spillover effects and influences the workings of 
the transmission channels differently. This is consistent with the notion that geographical 
proximity enhances the existence and magnitude of positive spillovers but is somewhat 
contrary to the theoretical predictions of Jordaan (2005) and Girma (2005) for the 
workings of both labor mobility and competition channels.  
Our findings suggest that gauging FDI-related spillovers is both a complicated 
process and a challenging issue. Each of spillover transmission channels need to identified 
and delineated clearly, and the effects of each of the channels needs careful and separate 
investigation before any meaningful and robust conclusions about spillover effects are 
reached. More future efforts for other countries should explore this line of research. 
Future studies should also direct the investigation towards approaches that allow the 
channels to vary according to the length of time a foreign company has been present in 
host countries. Unfortunately, our dataset does not allow us to identify duration since first 
entry. Alongside firm-level heterogeneity, technological characteristics, varieties of mode 
of entry, the country or nationality of FDI source, and the motives for foreign production 
need future investigation.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Distribution of the Firms by Country and Ownership 
 
Country 
Number of Firms 
 
% 
panel  Local Foreign Total 
All Panel All Panel All Panel 
DRC 740 150 148 34 888 184 12 
Ghana 1074 52 140 10 1214 62 4 
Kenya 1212 146 158 20 1370 166 10 
Malawi 520 121 153 53 673 174 11 
Senegal 1007 457 100 19 1107 476 30 
Tanzania 1055 45 87 5 1142 50 3 
Uganda  1025 150 178 24 1203 174 11 
Zambia 886 225 318 79 1204 304 19 
Total 7519 1346 1282 244 8801 1590 100 
 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of the Firms According to Ownership 
 
Surveys 
Domestic  Foreign  Total 
All  Panel All Panel All Panel 
First-wave/2006 3,129 670 503 125 3,632 795 
Second-wave/2014 4,393 676 779 119 5,169 795 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics control and outcome variables (panel) 
Variable All firms 
N=1578 
 Domestic firms 
N=1336 
Foreign firms 
N=242 
  t test for 
two-sample 
difference  Mean SD  Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Labor productivity  9.34 3.33  9.00 3.19 11.22 3.49 9.83 
Exports 0.08 0.27  0.06 0.24 0.19 0.39 6.58 
Foreign-owned 0.15 0.36  - - - - - 
Firm size (5-19) 0.62 0.49  0.67 0.47 0.34 0.48 -9.77 
Firm size (20-99) 0.26 0.44  0.24 0.43 0.35 0.48 3.50 
Firm size (100+) 0.12 0.33  0.09 0.29 0.31 0.46 9.61 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for Spillovers Channels  
 
Spillover Channels 
All foreign firms: 
N=242 
Majority-foreign 
owned: N=188 
Minority-foreign 
owned: N=54 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Demonstration 0.39 0.26 0.42 0.26 0.30 0.25 
Labor mobility 32.9 0.21 41.2 72.3 3.57 19.05 
Competition 0.18 4.90 0.07 5.55 0.58 0.47 
 
 
 
Table 5. FDI-Spillover Effects according to Transmission Channels 
 
Variable 
Panel A: 
   Linear (1) Curvilinear (2) 
Imitation (I)   1.670**  1.763** 
 [0.537] [0.415] 
Imitation2 (I2)       - -1.493 
  [1.690] 
Labor mobility (LM)   0.387* a  0.002 
  [0.194] [0.007] 
Labor mobility2 (LM2)   -  0.000 a 
  [0.000] 
Competition (C)    0.016* a -0.082*** a 
 [0.007] [0.050] 
Competition2 (C2)      - -0.000*** 
  [0.000] 
?̅?2    0.93    0.93 
F-statistics  938.44***   233.26*** 
AIC   1001.37   992.96 
N  1,576   1,576 
Notes: Results are from fixed-effects estimates. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at 
country level. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is logarithm of labor 
productivity of domestic firms. Regression include time, country and industry dummies. Control 
variables included are medium-sized firm, large-sized firm, firm age, capital intensity, exports, FDI 
firm, human capital, absorptive capacity, and technological gap.  In order to avoid multicollinearity 
and ensure better estimates, all continuous variables used for interactions are centered by subtracting 
the full sample means (Aiken and West, 1991)15. a Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 
a thousand to make the figures easier to read.     
Table 6. Technological Level and Spillovers Transmission Channels 
 Panel B: Small gap Panel C: Large gap 
                                                          
15 For instance, the correlation between the share of foreign presence, human capital and their 
interaction are 0.182 and 0.765 before centering and 0.086 and 0.515 after centering, respectively.   
Firm age 16.65 13.41  15.96 12.83 20.46 15.79 4.85 
Formal training 0.26 0.44  0.24 0.42 0.37 0.48 4.39 
Technological gap 0.71 0.45  0.77 0.42 0.43 0.49 -10.85 
Capital intensity 0.037 0.153  0.034 0.151 2.07 2.41 1.33 
Human capital 57.0 216.4  42.2 155.3 138.6 406.0 6.49 
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Variable Linear Curvilinear Linear Curvilinear 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Imitation (I)  25.404*** 29.27***   -2.043** -1.989*** 
 [7.102] [7.750] [0.594] [0.458] 
Imitation2 (I2)       -  0.000      -  0.095 
  [0.000]  [3.143] 
Labor mobility (LM) -0.484 a  -0.006  0.001**  0.002* 
 [2.474] [0.008] [0.0004] [0.001] 
Labor mobility2 (LM2)   - -0.002 a      -  0.005 a 
  [0.007]  [0.012] 
Competition (C)  0.044*** -0.026***   0.002***  0.015*   
  [0.006] [0.005] [0.0001] [0.009] 
Competition2 (C2)      -  0.006***      -  0.006 a 
  [0.0004]  [0.004] 
?̅?2  0.42  0.48     0.33   0.34  
F-statistics   621.75***  24.56***   237.08***  78.06*** 
AIC 805.25 760.25  1998.30 1986.16 
N     441      441   1,135   1,135 
Notes: See Table 5. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Absorptive Capacity and Spillovers Transmission Channels 
 
Variable 
Panel D: Low absorptive capacity Panel E: High absorptive capacity 
Linear Curvilinear Linear Curvilinear 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Imitation (I)   1.734**  2.006***    1.214 **  1.341** 
 [0.677] [0.550] [0.488] [0.454] 
Imitation2 (I2)       - -2.798      -  0.000 
  [1.971]  [0.000] 
Labor mobility (LM) -0.231 a  0.001 -0.246 a -0.003* 
 [0.472] [0.001] [0.915] [0.002] 
Labor mobility2 (LM2)   - -0.000      -  0.005* a 
  [0.000]  [0.003] 
Competition (C)  0.015 a  -0.0008*** -0.005*** -0.058**   
 [0.074] [0.0001] [0.001] [0.024] 
Competition2 (C2)      - -0.000***       - -0.088* a 
  [0.000]  [0.038] 
?̅?2   0.94  0.94    0.96  0.96 
F-statistics  63.98***  346.33***  4928.03*** 5370.74*** 
AIC 163.97   98.09   6.62 -22.96 
N     1,171      1,171    405    405 
Notes: See Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Further Investigation of FDI-Spillover Effects: ownership structure of foreign firms 
 Panel F: Majority-foreign-owned firms Panel G: Minority-foreign-owned firms 
24 
 
Variable Linear Curvilinear Linear Curvilinear 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Imitation (I)   1.575**  1.038    -0.244 -7.293  
 [0.505] [0.777]  [1.321] [4.706] 
Imitation2 (I2)       - -2.302      - 19.802 
  [1.544]  [12.809] 
Labor mobility (LM)  0.481* a  0.001    0.003  0.004 
 [0.229] [0.001]   [0.007] [0.018] 
Labor mobility2 (LM2)   -  0.000       - -0.034 a 
  [0.000]  [0.228] 
Competition (C)  0.002** -0.004 -0.359* -0.325*   
  [0.004] [0.038] [0.178] [0.147] 
Competition2 (C2)      -  0.089 a       - -0.123* 
  [5.470]  [0.043] 
?̅?2    0.93 0.93   0.93  0.93 
F-statistics                287.70***      304.96***  270.56***       314.78*** 
AIC               1003.81             1008.17  1031.38        1048.24 
N     1,576 1,576 1,576   1,576 
Notes: See Table 5.  
 
 
 
Table 9. Further Investigation of FDI-Spillover Effects: regional distribution of firms 
 
Variable 
Panel H: Mainly concentrated 
city/region   
Panel I: geographical dispersion: 
full sample   
Linear Curvilinear Linear Curvilinear 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Imitation (I)   4.124***  4.160***    1.686** 1.790*** 
 [0.939] [0.800] [0.539] [0.406] 
Imitation2 (I2)       - -0.352      - -1.592 
  [1.239]  [1.708] 
Labor mobility (LM)  0.0006**   0.068 a  0.384* a  0.225 a 
 [0.0002] [1.690] [0.193] [0.778] 
Labor mobility2 (LM2)   -  0.000      -  0.000 
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Competition (C)  -0.002 a 
[0.006] 
-0.081 a 
[0.059] 
 0.016* a 
[0.001] 
-0.082 a   
[0.053] 
Competition2 (C2)      - -0.000***      - -0.000* 
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Gini     -     -   0.006*  0.008* 
   [0.003] [0.004] 
?̅?2  0.94 0.94    0.93 0.93 
F-statistics  958.34*** 686.63***  1008.37*** 242.45*** 
AIC 391.02 385.79  1000.74 991.93 
N     942 942 1,576   1,576 
Notes: See Table 5.     
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Robustness Tests: FDI-Spillover Effects - spillovers and industry-time dummies 
Panel J: Dummy version of spillover Panel K: Industry-time dummies 
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Variable 
variables 
Linear Curvilinear Linear Curvilinear 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Imitation (I)   1.136**  0.331    1.552* 1.711** 
 [0.428] [0.728]     [0.582] [0.542] 
Imitation2 (I2)       -  0.741         - -1.489 
  [1.267]  [1.091] 
Labor mobility (LM)  0.393* a  0.246 a      0.159 a  0.136 a 
 [0.196] [0.695]     [0.111] [0.795] 
Labor mobility2 (LM2)   -  0.000         -  0.000 
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Competition (C)  0.015* a -0.142* a     0.008** a -0.075* a   
 [0.0006] [0.066]     [0.006] [0.039] 
Competition2 (C2)      - -0.000**         - -0.000* 
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
?̅?2   0.93  0.93         0.93  0.93 
F-statistics  529.59***  214.42***        271.22*** 261.88*** 
AIC 1009.48  662.99         749.73 734.52 
N 1,576 1,576 1,576   1,576 
Notes: See Table 5. 
 
 
Table 11. Robustness Tests: FDI-Spillover Effects - outcome variable and estimation method 
 
Variable 
Panel L: Value added per worker Panel M: Random-effects 
Linear Curvilinear   Linear Curvilinear 
     (1)      (2)       (3)    (4) 
Imitation (I)    1.236*  1.467***    0.848*** 1.048** 
  [0.526] [0.396] [0.315] [0.419] 
Imitation2 (I2)       -  -2.444      - -0.946   
  [1.677]  [0.963] 
Labor mobility (LM)  0.531** a  0.334 a  0.102 a -0.022 a 
 [0.202] [0.884] [0.147] [0.881] 
Labor mobility2 (LM2)   -  0.000 a      -  0.000  
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Competition (C)  -0.117*** a  0.001***   0.009*** a -0.063* a  
 [0.013] [0.0001] [0.003] [0.037] 
Competition2 (C2)      - -0.006*** a      - -0.000** 
  [0.003]  [0.000] 
?̅?2   0.85  0.87    0.93 0.93 
F-statistics   1488.06*** 1452.78***   8901.16*** 8308.20*** 
AIC  1981.93 1708.71    
N 1,524   1,524 1,576   1,576 
Notes: See Table 5. 
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List of empirical studies systematically reviewed for Developing countries  
Authors (year) Country Aggregation level Data Timespan 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) Venezuela Firm  1976-89 
Albornoz and Kugler (2008) Argentina Firm  1992-2001 
Aldaba and Aldaba (2012) Philippine Industry  1988-98 
Aslanoğlu (2000) Turkey Industry  1993 
Björk (2005) Chile Firm  2000 
Blalock and Gertler (2008) Indonesia Firm  1988-96 
Blalock and Gertler (2009) Indonesia Firm  1988-96 
Blalock and Simon (2009) Indonesia Firm  1988-96 
Blomström (1986) Mexico Industry  1970 
Blomström and Persson (1983) Mexico Industry  1970 
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) Indonesia Firm  1991 
Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) Mexico Industry  1970/75 
Blyde et al. (2004) Venezuela Firm  1995-2000 
Bouoiyour and Akhawayn (2003) Morocco Industry  1987-96 
Bwalya  (2006) Zambia Firm  1993-95 
Castro (2012) Chile Firm  2001-07 
Cheng (2011) Cambodia Firm  2005-06 
Chuang and Lin (1999) Taiwan Firm  1991 
Chudnovsky et al. (2008) Argentina Firm  1992-2001 
Cuyvers et al. (2008) Cambodia Firm  2000 
Erdogan (2011) Turkey Firm  2004-08 
Feinberg and Majumdar (2001) India Firm  1980-94 
Gachino (2010) Kenya Firm  1994-2001 
Haddad and Harrison (1993) Morocco Firm  1985-89 
Henning (2013) Ten Latin America Firm  2006-10 
Jordaan (2005) Mexico Firm  1993 
Jordaan (2008a) Mexico Firm  1994 
Jordaan (2008b) Mexico Firm  1994 
Jordaan (2011) Mexico Industry  1994 
Kathuria (2000) India Firm  1975-89 
Kathuria (2001) India Firm  1975-89 
Kathuria (2002) India Firm  1989-97 
Kathuria (2010) India Firm  1995-2005 
Kee (2005) Bangladesh Firm  1999-2003 
Kee (2013) Bangladesh Firm  1999-2003 
Khalifah and Adam (2009) Malaysia Firm  2000-2004 
Khawar (2003) Mexico Firm  1990 
Kinuthia (2013) Kenya and Malaysia Firm  2000-05 
Kohpaiboon (2006) Thailand Firm  1996 
Kokko (1994) Mexico Industry  1970 
Kokko (1996) Mexico Industry  1970 
Kokko et al. (1996) Uruguay Firm  1988 
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Kokko et al. (2001) Uruguay Firm  1988 
Kosteas (2008) Mexico Firm  1990 
Köymen (2009) Turkey Firm  1990-2001 
Le and Pomfret (2011) Viet Nam Firm  2000-06 
López (2002) Mexico Firm  1993-99 
Managi and Bwalya (2010) Kenya, Tanzania 
and Zimbabwe 
Firm  1993-95 
Marin and Bell (2006) Argentina Firm  1992-96 
Marin and Sasidharan (2010 India Firm  1994-2002 
Mebratie and Bedi (2013) South Africa Firm  2003-07 
Melese and Waldkirch (2011) Ethiopia Firm  2002-09 
Na-Allah and Muchie (2009) South Africa Industry  2004 
Narula and Marin (2005) Argentina Firm  1992-2001 
Nguyen (2008) Viet Nam Firm  2000-05 
Nguyen et al. (2008a) Viet Nam Firm  2000-04 
Nguyen et al. (2008b) Viet Nam Firm  2000-05 
Okot (2013) Uganda Firm  2005-2011 
Rattsø and Stokke (2003) Thailand Industry  1975-96 
Rutaihwa (2013) Tanzania Firm  2007 
Salim and Bloch (2009) Indonesia Firm  1988-2000 
Sarkar and Lai (2009) India Firm  2002-05 
Sasidharan and Ramanathan (2007) India Firm  1994-2002 
Sjöholm (1999a) Indonesia Firm  1980/1991 
Sjöholm (1999b) Indonesia Firm  1980/1991 
Takii (2005) Indonesia Firm  1990-95 
Takii (2009) Indonesia Firm  1990-95 
Takii (2011) Indonesia Firm  1990-95 
Taymaz and Yłlmaz (2008) Turkey Firm  1990-96 
Todo and Miyamoto (2006) Indonesia Firm  1994-97 
Thuy (2005) Viet Nam Industry  1992-99, 2000-02 
Van Thanh and Hoang (2010) Viet Nam Firm  2003-07 
Villegas-Sanchez (2009) Mexico Firm  1992-2001 
Waldkirch and Ofosu (2010) Ghana Firm  1992-98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. 
Testing for Sample Attrition: Probability of dropping out of the sample 
 Exports -0.091 
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  [0.111] 
 Foreign-owned -0.131 
  [0.141] 
 Firm size  
(20-99 workers) 
-0.115 
[0.128] 
 Firm size  
(100+ workers) 
-0.290 
[0.229] 
 Firm age 0.001 
  [0.001] 
 Formal training -0.019 
  [0.019] 
 Technological gap 0.467 
  [0.424] 
 Capital intensity 0.031 
  [0.024] 
 Human capital 0.000 
[0.000] 
 Constant 0.197 
  [0.296] 
   N 2,586 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at country level. The explanatory 
variables are used from the 2006 survey only. The dependent variable is a dropout dummy 
that takes the value one if the firm is not observed in the 2014 survey and zero otherwise.   
 
 
 
Table A3.  
Definition of Dependent and Independent Variables  
Variable Description 
Exports Firm is exporting  
Foreign-owned Foreign-owned firm if foreign participation is at least 10%   
Firm size (5-19 workers) Size of the firm is Small: 5-19 workers 
Firm size (20-99 workers) Size of the firm is Medium: 20-99 workers 
Firm size (100+ workers) Size of the firm is Large: 100 workers and mote 
Firm age Firm age: number of years they have been in operation 
Formal training Formal training programs for employees 
Technological gap The ratio of average foreign productivity to domestic productivity in the 
same country and sector 
Capital per labor   The logarithm of expenditure on Machinery, vehicles, and equipment 
per worker 
Human capital The total number of employees in a firm 
Demonstration Share of total sales in a given industry accounted for foreign firms 
Labor mobility The relative weight of foreign-owned firms in total employment in a 
sector 
Competition  
 
Price markup at firm level through the differences between firm’s total 
sales and costs over total sales 
labor productivity Logarithm of firm annual total sales per its worker 
 
